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ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND THE COURTS
By JAMES M. LANDISt
THrE MOST fascinating branch of American constitutional law relates
to judicial review over legislative action. Here one is presented with
decisions that breathe of contest between two agencies of government-
one, like St. George, eternally refreshing its vigor from the stream of
democratic desires, the other majestically girding itself with the wisdom
of the ages. Similarly, in the field of administrative law judicial review
over administrative action gives a sense of battle. Courts are not un-
conscious of the fact that, due to their own inadequacies, areas of govern-
ment formerly within their control have been handed over to adminis-
trative agencies for supervision. The legislative judgments underlying
such a partitioning of government do not always convince. Thus, under
the guise of constitutional and statutory interpretation, efforts to thwart
the effects of those legislative judgments are not uncommon.
An approach to the problem of judicial review cannot neglect that its
essence springs from the Anglo-American conception of the "supremacy
of law" or "rule of law," as it is variously called. Dicey in 1885 had
occasion to define its essence as follows:
"We mean," he says, speaking of the rule of law, "in the first place,
that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body
or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the or-
dinary legal manner before the ordinary Courts of the land . . ,,"
That definition practically excludes the idea of administrative adjudi-
cation except to the extent that the administrative can report its con-
clusions to a court. It implies the right to a trial do novo before a
judicial tribunal. However truly that may have described the area of
the administrative process in 1885, it is a misdescription of the scope
of the rule of law as it exists today.
In 1936 Mr. Justice Brandeis essayed a more modem definition. "The
supremacy of law," he states, "demands that there shall be opportunity
to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied;
and whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was con-
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ducted regularly." 2 Two elements, according to this, flow from the
concept of the "supremacy of law"- the right of a party to a judicial
determination as to the appropriate rule of law applicable to his par-
ticular case, and the right to a judicial determination as to the regularity
of the procedure employed by the administrative. Mr. Justice Brandeis'
analysis of the place of the "supremacy of lav" was, however, made in
protest against the insistence on the part of the majority of the Court
of a right to review findings of fact made by an administrative agency.
The area in which the courts insist that administrative findings of
fact cannot be final is an interesting one. It seems odd, very odd, as a
three-judge court has expressed it, that a Constitution "which expressly
makes findings of fiact by a jury of inexperienced laymen, if supported
by substantial evidence, conclusive . . . prohibits Congress making
findings of fact by a highly trained and especially qualified administra-
tive agency likewise conclusive, provided they are supported by sub-
stantial evidence." a
Prior to the rise- of regulatory administrative agencies, the determina-
tion of whether a particular rate charged by a common carrier was a
reasonable one could be had in an ordinary judicial tribunal. The func-
tion of adjudicating upon the reasonableness of that rate was naturally,
as an analytic matter, the exercise of judicial power, because it was a
thing that courts did. The inadequacies of that process to deal with the
rate problems of a national system of railroads led, of course, to the
institution of administrative agencies. But prior to the rise of the admin-
istrative .method of handling these issues, the Granger legislatures- of
the Middle Western States decided to deal directly with the problem of
unreasonable and discriminatory rates. By statute maximum rates were
established for certain roads, and iA 1877 the validity of that method
of handling the rate problem was upheld by the Supreme Court.4 Little
was then known, however, of the proper basis of rate-making. The
judicial process had developed no appropriate theories because its prior
contacts with the problem had been merely through litigation involving
individual rates, and the judgments setting aside particular rates did not
force the courts to 'consider the effect of this process of supervising
rates upon the operating revenues of the carrier as a whole. As rate-
making developed upon a large scale, it became clear that rate schedules
could make or break a carrier as well as make or break a community
or an industry. Some floor had to be created below which rates could
2. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 84 (1936).
3. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 322, 327 (W. D.
Mo. 1935).
4. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Chicago, B. & Q. Rr. v. Iowa, 94 U.S.
155 (1877); Peck v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 94 U. S. 164 (1877); Chicago, M. & St. P.
Rr. v. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179 (1877); Winona & St. P. Rr. v. Blake, 94 U. S. 180 (1877).
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not be compelled to drop, and the courts set themselves to find that floor.
Meanwhile, the technical difficulties of legislative rate-making becarge
so apparent that the legislatures created administrative agencies and
entrusted the task to them.
Rate-making thus, by the turn of the century, appeared to be more of
a legislative power than a judicial power. The administrative was seen
as taking the place of the legislature so that its functioning was easier
to analogize to the exercise of power by the legislative branch of govern-
ment than by the judicial branch. The fact that it acted with reference
to the rate situation as a whole rather than limiting its consideration to
the reasonableness of a rate as between a particular shipper and a car-
rier, and the fact that its orders were commands for the future and not
merely judgments as to the justifiability of a past exaction, led the courts
to classify its power in this respect as a legislative power.' At the same
time constitutional prohibitions against the strict legislative ekercise of
the rate-making power were in the process of development. Rates, the
Court said, could not be so low as to be confiscatory.' Later "confisca-
tory" was elaborated to be the establishment of rates so low as not to
yield a reasonable return dpon the value of the property devoted to the
business.' But "value," in turn, had to be elaborated. Standards, which
we need not examine for the moment, were set up to point to the factors
upon which judgments as to "value" should rest, standards whose appli-
cation left open wide areas for differences of opinion as to the weight
to be attached to the various facts that related to value.
The argument for insisting upon the necessity for an independent
judicial determination of findings of fact establishing values can be neatly
stated in the form of a syllogism." Rate-making is an appropriate exer-
cise of the legislative power provided that the rates are not confiscatory.
Whether or not they are confiscatory depends upon the correctness of
the finding as to value. Those facts must thus be independently found
by a court in order for a court to conclude that a particular legislative
act was within the legislative power; otherwise the legislature would
itself be finding the facts upon which the very exercise of legislative
power depends. It was thus not enough for a court to satisfy itself that
the trier of the facts, the administrative, had followed the correct rules
5. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 226 (1908).
6. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. $. 362 (194). For earlier
expressions, see Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307, 331 (1826);
Dow v. Biedelman, 125 U. S. 680, 689 (188) ; Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Smith.
128 U. S. 174 179 (1888); Chicago, Md. & St. P. R.R. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418,
455 (1890); Chicago & G. T. Ry. v. ,Vellman, 143 U. S. 339, 344 (1892).
7. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
8. See Buchanan, The Ohio Valley Water Company Case and the Valuation of
Railroads, (1927) 40 H, v. L. REv. 1033, 1037; Comment (1936) 50 HAnv. L. REy.
78, 83.
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as to valuation. Instead, the actual determination of value had to be
made by the court.
It was this reasoning that led the Supreme Court of the United States
in 1920, in the Ohio Valley Water case,9 to hold unconstitutional a
Pennsylvania statute which the Pennsylvania courts had concluded lim-
ited the right of judicial review over administrative determination of
value, to ihquiry simply as to whether there was evidence to support
the administrative finding. More was needed by the Constitution in
order for the Court to be sure that'the purported exercise of legislative
power was really an exercise of such power, and this was an independent
judicial determination upon the facts relating to value. Similarly, in
1936, the Court in the St. Joseph Stock Yards case,'" though it upheld an
order of the Secretary of Agriculture fixing the maximum rates that
could be charged by a stockyards company, insisted that the Constitution
required a court not merely to find that the Secretary had evidence
upon which to reach his findings as to the value of the property, but to
find of its own accord that upon the same evidence the Court would
reach the same conclusion as to the value of the property."'
This does not mean that in any proceeding in which valuation is itj
issue an administrative finding does not have the same finality as a jury
verdict. Law refuses to be that simple. In tax cases or in condemnation
cases when the amount due from, or payable to, a party depends upon
the valuation of pioperty,'an administrative finding on valuation is
final if supported by evidence. No independent judicial determination
of value is required.12 True, the same type of syllogistic reasoning might
le advanced in cases of this character. For the constitutionality of the
9. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920).
10. See note 2, supra.
11.. The distinction between mere review over administrative determination and
insistence upon independent judicial determination of the facts has been aptly sum-
marized by the court in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp.
322, 327 (1935) as follows: "When it is said that an independent judgment must be
reached by the court, it is meant that the court's findings must be determined by the
weight of the evidence and not by a consideration as to whether the findings of the
administrative agency are supported by substantial evidence or are arbitrary. A finding
may well be supported by substantial evidence and still be against the weight of the
evidence. The advocates of each of the two theories, (1) that the Court must give
its independent judgment on the record made and that, (2) it must accord a de novo
hearing, agree that the findings of the administrative agency should be looked upon as
presumptively correct. That is far less, however, than an acceptance of the findings
of the administrative agency as conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence
or are not arbitrary!'
12. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548 (1897); Long Island Water Supply Co. v.
Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685 (1897); Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142 (1922); San Diego
Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439 (1903); Kentucky Rr. Tax Cases, 115
U. S. 321 (1885).
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exaction of any particular sum depends upon whether the appropriate
ratio exists between the charge and the valuation of the property. Error
in valuation would mean an unconstitutional exaction, so that to prevent
an unconstitutional exercise of power an independent judicial determina-
tion as to value should be had. Proceedings in tax and condemnation
cases, however, are so like ordinary judicial proceedings that the readiQr
analogy for the Court in these cases is to liken administrative adjudica-
tion to judicial adjudication. In the latter findings of fact by juries are
conclusive if supported by evidence; so by analogy findings of adminis-
trative tribunals were given the same degree of finality.
A similar problem arose shortly after the enactment of the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.13 The story of
the effort to extend the benefits of workmen's compensation to persons
engaged in maritime employment is a grim comedy of errors. After
two futile attempts to bring these persons within the operation of state
workmen's compensation legislation,14 the Congress in 1927 set up a
system, modelled upon the state workmen's compensation laws, to govern
workers within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. The
constitutional power of the Congress in this respect extends only to the
admiralty jurisdiction. Whether or not a particular employee at a par-
ticular time is within that jurisdiction involves not only hyper-technical
questions of law but depends also upon what the facts with reference
to his employment and the situs of the injury are found to be."3 Further-
more, his right, to compensation rests, among other things, upon -his
ability to establish the existence of an employer-employee relationship
at the time of the injury. In 1932 in Crowell v. Benson 0 the Court
held that administrative findings of fact on these two issues could not
be made final, in the sense that they should stand if there was substantial
evidence to upport them. Instead, these two facts being jurisdictional
in the sense that the constitutional power of the Congress could extend
only to certain states of fact, an independent judicial determination had
to be had with reference to them. The syllogism here is-again apparent.
Constitutional power, according to the Court, extended only to the ad-
miralty jurisdiction and only to the imposition of absolute liability where
the employer-employee relationship existed. Constitutional power to deal
with the relationships involved in any particular case, therefore, depended
upon the existence of certain facts, and unless those facts were found by
13. Act of March 4, 1927, c. 509, 44 STAT. 1424.
14. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 (1917); Knickerbod:er Ice Co.
v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920); Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219 (1924).
See Palfrey, The Comnwn Law Courts and the Law of the Sea, (1923) 36 HAv.
L. REv. 777; Comment (1924) 37 Hav. L. REv. 478.
15. Comment (1927) 40 HARV. L. Ray. 485.
16. 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
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a court no assurance could be had that the particular case lay within the
sphere of the federal admiralty jurisdiction. The argument of the
minority that such syllogistic reasoning had equal application to other
facts upon which the issue of liability depended, was ignored by the
majority, as well as the plea that a sensible administration of justice
demanded that a degree of finality should attach to administrative find-
ings of fact.
I shall give a further illustration of the incidence of this doctrine
relating to so-called jurisdictional or constitutional facts as it concerns
another field. The power of the administrative to exclude or deport an
alien depends upon whether a particular individual is 'in fact an alien.
Indeed, the constitutional limits of the power to exclude or deport depend
upon that issue of alienage. An administrative finding of fact that an
individual is not a citizen but an alien is final when the issue is one of
exclusion." But when the issue is one of deportation, such finality ceases
to attach to that administrative finding. Instead, the party threatened
with deportation is entitled to an independent judicial determination of
his claim that he is a citizen of the United States."8
On the basis of logic the series of cases relating to jurisdictional and
constitutional facts is irreconcilable with those that grant finality to
administrative determinations of fact. They seem equally indefensible
from the standpoint of practical judgments as to the appropriate area
of administrative activity. It is true that in the deportation and exclu-
sion cases two great differences of a practical nature are to be found.
The first is that the process of exclusion, because of the number of aliens
seeking entry, demands something akin to a summary procedure, whereas
deportation exerts no such pressuire either in numbers or in the necessity
for speed of disposition. 9 The second is that the penalty of deportation
normally has more serious consequences. It tears up and disrupts the
pursuit of a livelihood that has already been entered upon; exclusion
simply denies the right to find new surroundings for living.
But if we move from these cases to the others, practical judgments
as to the desirability of court intervention fail to tally with the legalistic
conclusions. In the field of rate-making the effect of the Ohio Valley
Water case, coupled with the insistence of the Court that reproduction
cost must be given fair consideration in the determination of value, has
been to prolong interminably the process of administrative rate-making.
A delay of ten or fifteen years, an expenditure of millions of dollars,
constant interruption of administrative proceedings by appeals to the
courts, have brought the regulatory process into contempt. The practice
of appealing to the Court on every issue of fact relating to valuation has
17. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253 (1905).
18. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 (1922).
19. See VAN VLECK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF AIENS (1932) 210.
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transformed what should be a business-like proceeding into a bitter,
wrangling lawyers' battle. That after these many years of the effort
to develop workable regulatory controls, the New York State'Commis-
sion on the Revision of the Public Service Commissions Law can report
that "effective regulation along the lines originally intended by the Act
has broken down,' 20 spells little in the way of credit to the judicial
moulding of the area of administrative rate regulation.
In the field of workmen's compensation judicial review of administra-
tive findings of jurisdictional fact has equally little to commend it. If
Crowell v. Benson is to require the reintroductiori into the administration
of workmen's compensation legislation of the necessity for independent
judicial determination of those facts upon-which the jurisdiction of the
administrative rests - to say nothing of its intimation that a trial
de novo upon these issues is required -the very efficiency of the system
becomes threatened. Judicial review upon the issue of interstate com-
merce, as that issue is raised by litigation under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, had little to commend it. After twenty-five years of in-
cessant litigation the boundaries of that Act were still undefined. Yet,
in those twenty-five years, it was before the Supreme Court 172 times.2
A judgment upon such a problem as is involved in questions such as
that Act raised, or upon issues of fact such as those presented by Crowell
v. Benson, as distinguished from a judgment establishing a rule of
conduct, has neither force as a precedent nor as a decision is it capable
of analogical development. It settles that case alone, and opening up
such determinations to appellate review makes against the finality that
should attach to litigation, particularly in these fields. One especially
unfortunate effect attaching to judicial intervention in cases of this
character has been aptly summarized by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his
comment upon the practical effect of Crowell v. Benson upon the admin-
istration of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act. "Since."
he says, "the advantage of prolonged litigation lies with the party able
to bear heavy expenses, the purpose of the Act will in part be defeated. "
The explanation of these insistences that the administrative process
in these phases must be subject to judicial review firids, I believe, some
answer in economic determinism. But the deeper answer lies in our
traditional notions of "law" as being rules administered and developed
by courts. NVe must remember that until a comparatively short time
ago Anglo-American government was essentially government by judges.
The great mass of our law was developed by the resolution of conflicting
20. N. Y. STATE CoumissioN o-z REvxsxo OF THE PUBLIC SmVt COMx'4ISSIouls
LAW, REPORT OF ComxIIssioN-Rs (1930) 1.
21. Schoene and Watson, JVorkinen's Compensation on Interiate Railways (1934)
47 H~Auv. L. Rz V. 389.
22. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 94 (1932).
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claims in courts where the governing rules were evolved by the judge.
In contract, in tort, in negotiable instruments, in trusts- the body of
our law is judge-made and represents the successive reactions to practical
situations of a professional class that was nurtured in the same tradi-
tions and was subject to the limitations of the same discipline.23 That
class has had pride in its handiwork. Nor cani one deny its right to
pride. But the claim to pride tends, especially in the hands of lesser men,
to be a boast of perfection. It is a rare greatness that recognizes experi-
ence as the life of the law. A lesser vision, fearful of the frailty of
human thought and human judgment, claims Delphic powers, and rests
the learning of the law upon an affinity with deep and mysterious prin-
ciples of justice that none but itself can grasp. Deep resentment thus
attaches to any criticism of its inadequacies, any suggestion as to its
biases. To admit to the dispensation of justice other individuals, no
matter how wise, who are not bound by the older disciplines, is regarded
with horror.
Chief Justice Hughes, in addressing the Federal Bar Association in
1931, speaks of the growth of administrative law in the following fashion:
"A host of controversies as to provisional rights are no longer
decided in courts. Administrative authority, within a constantly
widening sphere of action, and subject only to the limitations of
certain broad principles, establishes particular rules, finds the facts,
and decides as to particular rights. The power of administrative
bodies to make findings of fact which may be treated as conclusive,
if there is evidence both ways, is a power of enormous consequence.
An unscrupulous administrator might be tempted to say, 'Let me
find the facts for the people of my country, and I care little who
lays down the general principles.' We all recognize that this devel-
opment has been to a great extent a necessary one . . . Experience,
expertness and continuity of supervision, which could only be had
by administrative agencies in a particular field, have come to be
imperatively needed. But these new methods put us to new tests,
and the serious question of the future is whether we have enough of
the old spirit which gave us our institutions to save them from
being overwhelmed' 2
But it is just because some of those .old institutions had proved inept
for a modern society that a new spirit has sought to shift their emphasis.
I spoke before of the issue of judicial review over administrative action
giving one the sense of battle. Nowhere does that more clearly come to
the surface than in the recent case of Jones v. Securities and Exchange
ComnnZission.25 In the early days of the administration of the Securities
23. Landis, Business Policy and the Courts (1938) 27 YALE Rzv. 235.
24. New York Times, February 13, 1931, p. 18.
25. 298 U. S. 1 (1936).
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Act of 1933 the question was raised of how to handle a registrant's
request to be permitted to withdraw his registration statement prior to
its effectiveness. Examination of a registration statement filed with the
Commission might give rise to a belief that some of the assertions it
contained were false. A quiet investigation into the facts would then
be made, and, if this gave ground for that belief, stop order proceedings
would then be initiated. To avoid public exposure of an attempt to
defraud the public, a registrant might seek to withdraw. The withdrawal
of the statement would, it is true, operate to prevent the acquisition of
any right to offer to the public the securities that were sought to be
registered. As such it had an effect similar to the entry of a stop order.
But misstatement of material facts and the avowed attempt to defraud
the public seemed to the Commission serious matters. To allow a regis-
trant to escape the consequences that should flow from such misconduct
by the simple act of withdrawing his registration statement appeared
inadequate. It was possible, as a theoretical matter, to try to indict a
registrant whose misstatements had been deliberate; but the chances of
conviction for crime, when, due to the vigilance of the administrative
no one had been defrauded, are doubtful.20 The better course seemed to
be to establish a record of fraud after a hearing and in such a manner
inform the investment world of the fraud that was attempted and the char-
acter of parties to it. With that in mind, a rule was adopted making
withdrawal depend upon the consent of the Commission, and a practice
was pursued of denying withdrawals whenever there was reasonable
ground to believe that deliberate, material misstatements had been made
by a registrant.
In 1936 the validity of that practice was challenged in the Supreme
Court of the United States. Doubt quite generally existed as to the
power of the Commission to promulgate a rule governing withdrawals
in view of the silence of the statute upon the subject of withdrawals;
but assuming the validity of the rule, the exercise of discretion to deny
withdrawals in the manner indicated seemed quite appropriate. The
Supreme Court, however, took a different view. It assumed that the
general rule was valid but denied any power to the Commission to refuse
withdrawals in cases where the registration statement was still ineffective
and where no securities had as yet been sold.
Such a result was not too surprising. But the process of thought by
which the Court reached its conclusion still startles. By analogical rea-
soning of a familiar character, the Court likened the stop order proceed-
ing to a suit in equity. Then finding that the equity practice permitted
a plaintiff to withdraw his suit at any time, if that withdrawal would not
26. Two parties involved in the stock promotion, the facts of which are set forth in
In the Matter of Continental Distillers and Importers Corporation [1 S. E. C. 54 (1935)]
were indicted in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia but were acquitted.
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prejudice the defendant, it concluded that this equity practice must bind
the Commission. Consequently the Commission should not have denied
the request 9 f the particular registrant to withdraw his statement. Had
the Courf stopped there, one might have regretted its conclusion as
weighting the scales in favor of fraudulent promoters, but that would
have been all. Had the case involved a misapplication of the equity
practice by any inferior judge, the Court would have stopped there,
pointed out the error, and reversed his conclusion. But for the Com-
mission not to realize that its stop order proceedings were like suits in
equity and not to be aware of the equity practice was not merely to
commit an error; in the words of Mr. Justice Sutherland, it was "the
assumption of arbitrary power by an administrative body."2 "The
action of the Commission," Mr. Justice Sutherland thundered, "finds no
support in right principle or in law. It is wholly unreasonable and arbi-
trary. It violates the cardinal precept upon which the constitutional
safeguards of personal liberty ultimately rest- that this shall be a
government of laws- because to the precise extent that the mere will
of an official or an official body is permitted to take the place of allowable
official discretion or to supplant the standing law as a rule of human
conduct, the government ceases to be one of laws and becomes an autoc-
racy."28 There was more in this vein- suggestions of unreasonable
search and seizure, and intimation that the Commission's action was
"among those intolerable abuses of the Star Chamber, which brought
that institution to an end at the hands of the Long Parliament in 1640"20
- a remark that brought forth from Mr. Justice Cardozo the terse
comment: "Historians may find hyperbole in the sanguinary simile."3 0
Such an outburst indicates that one is in a field where calm judicial
temper has fled. Deep feelings underlie this unguarded language of Mr.
Justice Sutherland. They underlie, too, the suggestion by the Chief
Justice that the administrative is prone to abuse the powers entrusted it.
Rhetoric of this nature has a purpose. If it is fair to apply the legal
rule that one intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts,
certainly the effect if not the purpose was to breed distrust of the admin-
istrative. Invective, such as Mr. Justice Sutherland hurled at the Com-
mission for an action that three Justices commended as "wisely conceived
and lawfully adopted to foil the plans of knaves intent upon obscuring
or suppressing the knowledge of their knavery" 3 - an action which, at
its worst, was a pardonable technical error - was naturally seized upon
by every opponent of security regulation, for none of them, even in the
27. Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 19 (1936).
28. Id., at 23-24.
29. Id., at 28.
30. Id., at 33.
31. Ibid.
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heat of the legislative struggle, had indulged in such hyperbole. Its effect
was not to promote that calmness of atmosphere in which wise adminis-
tration flourishes. For months thereafter every effort to deal with fraud-
ulent promoters was met by the accusation that Star Chamber tactics
were being employed. But worse, to the uninitiated who have neither
time nor the ability to grasp the precise issue involved by a particular
case, the cause of good administration suffered by this excoriation, natur-
ally headlined by the press, of administrative action as arbitrary and
violative of ancient rights and privileges.
The most disputed field of judicial review over administrative action
today concerns the finality of administrative findings upon so-called issues
of constitutional or jurisdictional fact. Apart from the incidence of that
problem in the immigration field, the cases, upholding the claim to an
independent judicial determination of these issues, have all been decided
by a divided Court. In the Ohio Valley lWater case, three Justices dis-
sented; in Crowell v. Benson, three justices dissented; in the St. Joseph
Stock Yards case, three Justices dissented from the conclusion of the
Court on this point, and a fourth Justice, Mr. Justice Roberts, indicated
by his memorandum of concurrence and his earlier dissent in Crowell
v. Benson, doubt as to the validity of the Court's position; in Baltimore
& Ohio R.R. v. United States, 2 a case in which the majority took occa-
sion by way of dictum to reiterate its view s, four Justices took occasion
to emphasize that they would not support the majority on that issue. In
view of these divisions, the law as to what finality shall attach to ad-
ministrative findings of fact is likely to reflect the minority's rather than
the majority's view. Because their reasoning seems more to accord with
the temper of the times, it is they. rather than the majority, who are
likely to gain adherents to their position.
The basis of the minority's position is thus of absorbing interest. Its
rejection of the syllogistic position of the majority is unimportant. What
matters are the positive reasons advanced for its conclusions. They group
themselves about the thesis that the more appropriate tribunal for the
determination of these issues is the administrative. Great emphasis,
however, is placed upon the constitution of the adjudicating administra-
tive agency. Its composition and its procedure condition its fitness as an
instrument for the determination of these issues. Air. Justice Brandeis
twice notes that in these cases the Court is not dealing with informal,
summary administrative action based on ex parte, casual inspection or
unverified information, where "no record is preserved of the evidence
on which the official acted," but "with formal, deliberate quasi-judicial
decisions of administrative tribunals, based on findings of fact expressed
in writing, and made after hearing evidence and argument under the
32. 298 U. S. 349 (1936).
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sanctions and the safeguards attending judicial proceedings." 3 3 The
choice by the legislature of such a procedure for the determination of
these issues of fact is thus not deemed by him to involve a violation of
the due process clause.
The minority is not only sympathetic with the administrative process;
it hopes to encourage its capacity to dispose more effectively of the busi-
ness entrusted to it. It fears that the majority doctrine, by reserving
judgment on these issues to the courts, will imperil the responsibility that
should attend the administrative process. Indeed, a world of difference
in temper and in outlook separates the denunciatory fervor of Mr.
Justice Sutherland in the Jones case from the hope of the administrative
process that inheres in Mr. Justice Brandeis' observation-"Responsibility
is the great developer of men." 4
The positive reason for declining judicial review over administrative
findings of fact is the belief that the expertness of the administrative,
if guarded by adequate procedures, can be trusted to determine these
issues as capably as judges. If so, it is only delay that results from
insistence upon independent judicial examination of the administrative's
conclusion. This evaluation of the scope of judicial considerations in
terms of administrative expertness points to the reasons for the differ-
entiation of treatment between the rate-making cases and the inimigra-
tion cases. The minority has explained that distinction upon two bases.
One is that the adjudications are not made by quasi-judicial adminis-
trative agencies that transact their business in a manner similar to courts.
This premise, however, is questionable in view of the internal organi-
zation of the office of the Commissioner of Immigration. The other basis
is that the right involved is more than a property right; it is the right
to the liberty of the person. It is true that the claim "Civis romanu.i
sum" echoes down the ages with more power to stir the heart than a
claim that property has been undervalued. One cannot criticize a magis-
trate who feels an urge to give it every protection that he can. But
apart from these bases for distinction, it should be observed that the
issue of citizenship is triable in a simple manner. Little in the way of
expertness is demanded for its determination. The record of facts that
underlies its establishment is a simple one. In their most extended form
such records do not reach the 3466 pages that the Court had before it
in the St. Joseph Stock Yards case. That, after all, was "ratc regulation
in its simplest form," as contrasted with the 36,893 pages, not including
3,324 exhibits, that comprised the record before the District Court in
the New York Telephone Company rate case.35
33. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 81 (1936); see
also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 88 (1932).
34. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 92 (1936).
35. Id., at 90.
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If the extent of judicial review is being shaped, as I believe, by refer-
ence to an appreciation of the qualities of expertness for decision that
the administrative may possess, important consequences follow. The
constitution of the administrative and the procedure employed by it be-
come of great importance. That these factors already in part mould
the scope of judicial review is apparent from the decisions. Different
agencies receive different treatment from the courts. A reputation for
fairness and thoroughness that attaches to a particular agency seeps
through to the judges and affects them in their treatment of its decisions.
Fairness and thoroughness may also be apparent upon the record as it
reaches the court, so as to lead the court to the conclusion that the evi-
dence has received the attention that it deserved and that it would have
received in the hands of one trained in legal techniques.
The interesting problem as to the future of judicial review over ad-
ministrative action is the extent to which judges wilt withdraw, not from
reviewing findings of fact, but conclusions upon law. If the withdrawal
is due to the belief that these issues of fact are best handled by experts,
a similar impulse to withdraw should become manifest in the field of
law. This problem can be seen better, I think, if put concretely. An
administrative finding in a rate-making controversy as to the value of
a particular generating station, made after hearing and upon evidence,
we may assume will hereafter be final. The administrative, whose daily
concern is the consideration of these matters, is recognized to possess
greater competence in appreciating the b-earing and weight of testimony
upon that issue than would characterize either a judge or a jury. For
this reason to allow finality to rest with the administrative violates no
constitutional prohibition. But the same considerations of expertness
have validity in the field of law. A determination by an administrative
agency that a particular trade practice is an unfair method of competition
is a determination theoretically not of fact but of law. But despite the
assumed expertness of the administrative in weighing the economic con-
sequences attendant upon that practice, its decision as yet has no finality.
The scope of judicial review in such a case is wholly diffrent.
I use these terms "fact" and "law" knowing how tenuous the dis-
tinction between them is. Professor Dickinson in his study on Admin-
istrative Justice and the Suprcnac, of Law in the United States rejects
the distinction completely. "In truth," he says, "the distinction between
'questions of law' and 'questions of fact' really gives little help in de-
termining how far the courts will review; and for the good reason that
there is no fixed distinction. They are not two mutually exclusive khinds
of questions, based upon a difference of subject-matter. Matters of law
grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach upward,
without a break, into matters of law . . . It would seem that when
the courts are unwilling to review, they are tempted to explain by the
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easy device of calling the question one of 'fact', and when otherwise
disposed, they say that it is a question of 'law'." '
It is impossible to disagree with this statement as a description of the
present state of the decisions dealing with judicial review of adminis-
trative action. But the rejection of the distinction, though it may accord
with the fact, leaves nothing upon which to base a philosophy as to the
appropriate spheres of administrative and judicial activity. If our basic
constitutional conceptions adhere to a belief in the "supremacy of law"
-a belief in an inviolable area for the resolution of claims by courts
- it must give some content to the word "law." Collecting the cases
and illustrating how the scope of judicial review varies with reference to
different administrative agencies and different areas of activity will give
a picture of its operation. But such an analysis fails to satisfy the de-
mands for a creative philosophy that seeks a basis upon which to allot
law-making by adjudication as between courts and administrative.
Section -10(a) of the Securities Exchange Act authorized the Com-
mission in connection with the purchase or sale of any securities to
proscribe the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance"
by rule or regulation, as the Commission might deem necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. B y
the amendments of 1936 brokers and dealers in the over-the-counter
market were forbidden to effect transactions in securities by means of
"any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance,"
and the Commission was empowered by rule or regulation to "define
such devices or contrivances as are manipulative, deceptive or otherwise
fraudulent." Pursuant to the authority granted by these sections the
Commission adopted a series of rules forbidding certain specified prac-
tices that it conceived to be "manipulative, deceptive or fraudulent."
Among them is the requirement that a broker or dealer who controls,
or is controlled by the issuer of a security must disclose the existence
of that control before entering into any contract with a customer for
the purchase or sale of that security. Another rule forbids a broker or
dealer who handles a discretionary account to make purchases or sales
in that account which are excessive in size or frequency, in view of the
financial resources and character of that account. A third forbids a
distributing broker or dealer to offer securities "at the market" unless
he believes that a market exists for that security other than such as lie
or his associates may create.
Here are samples of law-making by regulation, specifically pricking
out the content of the statutory concept of "manipulative, deceptive and
fraudulent" devices. The authority of the Commission to promulgate
and enforce these rules can, of course, be tested in court. Such a suit
36. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES (1927) 55.
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would raise the issue of whether the action taken was within the author-
ity granted to the Commission. That issue would lead the court gener-
ally to consider whether the particular conduct described in any particular
rule could fairly be called "manipulative, deceptive or fraudulent." But
the court would hardly ask itself whether it would, of its own accord,
have prescribed such a rule. In other words, the scope of judicial review
in such a case would be somewhat akin to that of judicial review over
the validity of legislation challenged under the due process clause. A
reasonable belief held by the administrative, since it was acting in the
manner of a legislature, that such practices tended to promote fraud and
deceit in the security markets would, in all probability, be sufficient upon
which to base the validity of the rule. The administrative judgment upon
this issue would tend further to have much weight because of its assumed
expertness.
It is true that in two recent cases the Supreme Court of the United
States indulged in talk to the effect that the promulgation of such regula-
tions in order to have validity must be buttressed by findings of fact."
How far this suggestion should be taken seriously is a matter of con-
siderable doubt. Rules of this character are themselves evidence of ad-
ministrative judgment that the particular conduct embraced by them does
normally promote fraud and deceit. A further recital to that effect
would be a matter of mere formality. The evidence upon which the
conclusions that lead to the adoption of such rules rests is rarely of a
type that is legally admissible for the patent reason that it was not
gathered for the purpose of introducing it in an adversary proceeding.
It resembles more the type of evidence adduced in a hearing before a
Congressional committee. In the main it consists of opinions of men
acquainted with the practices of the security markets. Instances may
have come to the attention of the administrative of actual losses caused
by those practices which thus focussed the Commission's attention upon
the desirability of putting an end to conduct of that type. But the ulti-
mate judgment of the administrative rests on considerations that evolved
out of a wide range of experience and observation and out of its study
of security practices. To set them forth in detail would make a treatise
on practices in the over-the-counter market rather than a limited series
of recitals. To require this range of evidence to be reduced to findings
of fact is as equally unrealistic as to impose a requirement upon legis-
latures that specific findings of fact must be a prelude to the passage of
legislation.38 These suggestions of the Court that findings of fact are
37. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
38. But see Oppenheimer, The Supreme Court ad AdMniislralvo Law, (1937)
37 COL. L. REv. 1, 15. I have had occasion elsewhere to comment upon the desirability
of recitals, but to lift them to the level of jurisdictional requirements seems unrealistic.
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a condition precedent to administrative rule-making have yet to be elab-
orated before their meaning can be understood.
The incidence of judicial review over administrative law-making by
way of rules can be contrasted with the scope of judicial review in cases
where the law-making of the administrative flows from adjudication.
Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act the administra-
tive is authorized to restrain "unfair methods of competition" in inter-
state commerce. No express power to define unfair competition by
regulation was granted to the Commission. Instead, the pricking out of
such rules as alone can make real the nature of "unfair methods of com-
petition" came from the process of adjudication. Judicial review over
these decisions takes on a different character. The Court now avowedly
inquires into the wisdom of any particular rule that the administrative
may have evolved and considers its likeness to existing doctrine in the
field. In the first case under this Section that reached the Supreme
Court; Federal Trade Commission v. GratZ,3 9 the Commission had ruled
that the refusal of a jobber, who held a dominant and controlling posi-
tion in the sale of cotton ties, to sell ties unless the purchaser would
agree to buy a proportionate share of cotton bagging was an unfair
method of competition. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission
over the dissent of two Justices. In considering the question of whether
to uphold the action of the administrative the Court did not limit itself
to the consideration of whether reasonable grounds existed for the
Commission's conclusion. - Such grounds clearly did exist. The Court
instead conceived its function to embrace the right independently to
determine what the appropriate rule of law should be. Its approach
was identical with that which it would possess were it reviewing'a legal
ruling by a lower court. This remains the general doctrine. It is true
that on occasion some deference will be paid to the administrative judg-
ment on the ground that it possesses some expertness with reference to
the subject-matter, but the deference is a matter of attitude in a par-
ticular case rather than of doctrine.
The conception that judicial review of administrative adjudication
and of administrative legislation should be assimilated to each other has
yet to gain recognition. But the problem seems essentially to have the
same core. For the issues raised by the effort to find the appropriate
governing rule through adjudication require appreciation and evaluation
of a wide variety of business facts. In that process there is room for
differences of opinion, differences that spring from the degree of
emphasis placed upon these facts. The expert judgment of the admin-
See Landis, The Study of Legislation In Law Schools (1931) 39 HAV. GRAD,. MAO.
433, 441.
39. 253 U. S. 421 (1920).
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istrative here, however, counts for little, for since the rule evolves as a
result of the process of adjudication it now partakes of the nature of a
question of law, and upon that issue an ultimate and independent judg-
ment is said to rest with the court.
It would have added much to our ideas of the appropriate spheres for
judicial and administrative activity, if the administrative in a field such
as this had been given the power to evolve the meaning of "unfair
methods of competition" by regulation as well as by decision. The rela-
tionship of judicial review to forms of administrative activity dealing
with the same subject-matter might thus have been more sharply brought
into focus. As it appears now, we seem to have one of those curious
paradoxes of the law. In Truax v. Corrigan"0 the Supreme Court held
that the State of Arizona by legislation could not bring about a rule
of law which even then had been established by judicial decision in the
State of New York as the governing rule of human conduct.4 ' In the
field of administrative activity it may be that results can be reached
by the process of administrative legislation which cannot be achieved
through administrative adjudication.
I return thus to the issue of "law" as being the dividing line of judi-
cial review- as bounding the province of that "supremacy of law"
that is still our boast. Its content, insofar as it relates to judicial review
of administrative action, seems to me to reach back to the issue of
expertness. Our desire to have courts- determine questions of law is
related to a belief in their possession of expertness with regard to such
questions. It is from that very desire that the nature of questions of
law emerges. For, in the last analysis, they seem to ine to be those
questions that lawyers are equipped to decide.
To view "law" in this fashion seems to me to bring reason into our
conceptions of the supremacy of law. It seems to afford some guide to
moulding the protess of judicial review over both legislative and admin-
40. 257 U. S. 312 (1921).
41. This is the contention advanced by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting
opinion. He points to the fact that in his judgment the Arizona statute, held unconsti-
tutional by the majority, set forth the substance of the common law as it had been
declared by the courts of Ohio, Minnesota, Montana, New York, Oklahoma and New
Hampshire. I should question, however, whether the common law of any of these states
legalized the particular type of picketing involved in the Truax Case, which the
Supreme Court of Arizona, because of the statute, held was not subject to the injunctive
processes of the state courts. Similar paradoxes are to be found. Compare. for example,
the restrictions upon state legislative action in violation of the due prccess clause and
the scope of such restrictions as applied to state judicial action. Comment (1923)
36 HARv. L. REv. 1022; Comment (1923) 37 Hav. L Rsv. 247. See also the effort
to extend the impairment of the obligation of contracts clause to protect against judicial
as well as legislative action in Muhlker v. New York & Harlem Rr., 197 U. S. 544
(1905).
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istrative action. It explains the variances in the scope of judicial review
over administrative agencies of different compositions and charged with
the disposition of different subject-matters. It .lends emphasis to the
insistence of Mr. Justice Brandeis that differences in treatment should
be accorded to findings of fact by different administrative officials, be-
cause of differences in the facts and in the qualities of the administrative
to be expert in finding the facts. It removes nothing from the insistence
that policy plays a commanding role in the shaping of judicial review,
but in the place of a simple theory of economic determinism, or of a
barren logic, it substitutes a sense of emphasis upon intellectual quality
and discipline as related to a particular problem. The line of demarca-
tion will then speak in terms of reality, in terms of an appreciation of
the limitations and abilities of men, rather than in terms of political
dogma or of righteous abstractions.
Of course, such a conception of law as related to spheres of judicial
and administrative activity affords no definite answers. It must not do
so, for the capacities of men and the nature of disciplines will vary. But
it does point to the elements that should control judgment. And from
the standpoint of affording conceptions of liberty real meaning, one
can ask little more than to have issues decided by those best equipped
for the task.
Such a conception of the nature of law does not remove the sense of
battle which dominates the question of judicial review over administrative
action. But it makes that contest rest upon a plane where the issues
relate to the ability of men to handle subject-matter. As such, the
contest should partake more of that rivalry that attends the academic
scene, where a passionate desire for truth makes for recognition and
not resentment of achievement.
The world of today as distinguished from that of even a hundred
years ago is one of many professions. We can no longer divide it, in
its civil aspect, between the church, the law, and medicine. Economics,
politic science, sociology, social ethics, labor economics, engineering in
its various branches, all are producers of disciplines relating to the ar-
rangement of human affairs. Government today no longer dares to
rely for its administration upon the casual office-seeker. Into its service
it now seeks to bring men of professional attainment in various fields
and to make that service such that they will envisage the art of govern-
ance as a career. The desires of these men to share in the mediation of
human claims cannot be denied; their contributions dare not casually be
tossed aside.
The grandeur that is law loses nothing from such a prospect. Instead,
under its banner as a commanding discipline are enlisted armies of men
dedicated to the idea of justice. But to use those armies, a sense of the
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effectiveness of their units is essential and an instillation in those units
of morale. "Courts," as Mr. Justice Stone has reminded us, "are not
the only agency of government that must be assumed to have capacity
to govern;"'42 nor are they, one can add, the only agency moved by the
desire for justice. The power of judicial review under our traditions of
government lies with the courts because of a deep belief that the
heritage they hold makes them experts in the synthesis of design. Such
difficulties as have arisen have come because courts cast aside that role
to assume to themselves expertness in matters of industrial health, utility
engineering, railroad management, even bread-baking. 43 The rise of
the administrative process represented the hope that policies to shape
such fields could most adequately be developed by men bred to the facts.
That hope is still dominant, but its possession bears no threat to our
ideal of the "supremacy of law." Instead, it lifts it to new heights where
the great judge, like a conductor of a many-tongued symphony, from
what would otherwise be discord, makes known through the voice of
these many instruments the vision that has been given him of man's
destiny upon this earth.
42. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 87 (1935).
43. See Landis, Address before the Fourth Annual Woman Congress, March 10,
1937, 81 CoNG. REc. APP. 503.
